The Determinants of the Expansion of the Exchange Rate on the Black Market in the Maghreb by Bouazizi, S.E.
Financial Markets, Institutions and Risks, Volume 4, Issue 1, 2020                                                                                                     
ISSN (online) – 2521-1242 ISSN (print) – 2521-1250 
32 
 
The Determinants of the Expansion of the Exchange Rate on The Black 
Market in The Maghreb 
http://doi.org/10.21272/fmir.4(1).32-39.2020 
Said El Bouazizi, ORCID:  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7687-1900 
Professor, Member of LERSEM Laboratory, National School of Business and Management, University of 
Chouaib Doukkali, El Jadida, Morocco 
Abstract 
The shadow economy has recently grown significantly in the overall national economy. In the Maghreb 
countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania), the informal economy is the result of the 
introduction of a managed economy, which gradually forms the prerequisites for the emergence of a monetary 
deficit in these countries. Since the early 1990s, after the institutional changes in the market economy, a black 
currency exchange has taken a significant turn, which was accompanied by a large gap between the black 
market and official currency exchange. The relevance of this study is to determine the leverage of the exchange 
rate on the black market, which will determine the causes and factors of the expansion of this market. The 
purpose of the paper is to analyze the key determinants of determining the nature and dynamics of the black 
market exchange rate, as exemplified by the Maghreb countries in the context of long-term relations. The 
methodological support of the study includes the grouped mean group method and the Granger causality test. 
The author substantiates the following determinants of the shadow market exchange rate: the official exchange 
rate, the official real exchange rate, the differential expected rate of return, money supply, the level of reserves 
and prices. The study empirically confirms that the official exchange rate is the most significant variable that 
most influences the exchange rate in the shadow market, the official real exchange rate plays a secondary role 
in determining the black market exchange rate. These results are confirmed in the Granger causality test, 
which revealed the existence of unidirectional causality between the dependent black market exchange rate 
and the independent variables - the official rate, the official real currency rate, and the differential expected 
rate of return. Based on the conducted research, the author has identified the following recommendations for 
public authorities: 1) managing the shadow currency exchange market is possible in the context of adopting a 
complex of measures to diversify the sources of currency and implementing a monetary policy on the interest 
rate based on external rates; 2) the formation of a price control mechanism that will help reduce dependence 
on the international market. The paper focuses on the further use of the currency hedging instrument in the 
financial practice of the Maghreb banking system. The author emphasizes the need for the Central Bank to 
establish appropriate instructions for commercial banks on the organization and functioning of the interbank 
foreign exchange market in foreign trade operations. 
Keywords: currency exchange; the black market; Granger causality; heterogeneity; money supply; official 
course. 
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Introduction 
Illicit or black markets are an important part of the economy of various developing countries. The restrictions 
imposed by the government on the free exchange of currencies, create a dual system of exchange rate (black 
and official). The resulting differentiation between the official and the black market exchange rates leads to 
diverting export earnings from the official market to the black market (Kutan 1998). Many countries have 
established a legal or tolerated black market. 
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This is complemented by the creation of a legal or semi-legal parallel market and allowing it to operate 
strongly with the official market. Under this type of parallel market regime, current account transactions are 
settled in the official government-controlled rate and the parallel rate are  used for capital transactions (Kutan 
1998). 
The choice of an exchange rate regime is always a subject of debate that has a direct impact on the flowering 
of the black market exchange. A foreign exchange regime defines the way in which the value of the national 
currency is determined in relation to a foreign currency. In reality, there are two extreme regimes and 
anchoring regimes, that is to say intermediate. The monetary authorities are interested in the issue of the 
optimal exchange rate policy in a perspective of openness to capital movements. A regime that is not adapted 
to the economic and financial reality leads to an imbalance of macroeconomic indicators. Several studies have 
addressed the issue of adoption of a particular plan. In a fixed exchange rate regime the probability that 
exchange rates become overvalued is much higher than that of floating regimes. Overvaluation can have a 
negative impact on economic performance and reduce the profitability of goods for export (Dornbusch et al 
1984). The Maghreb countries were based on a fixed rate, although the traditional models of the choice of 
exchange rate rates explain that this fixed regime is not adapted to economic development which favors the 
development of the informal exchange market. Maghreb countries are encouraged to favor this regime because 
of two factors. The first argument is the rapid inflation recorded in the late 1980s and the 1990s. The fixed 
exchange rate is then adopted as the most effective strategy to counter inflation. The second argument 
emphasizes that the fixed rate regime has helped to preserve macroeconomic balances at critical moments. 
Several studies indicate that anchoring regimes are more subject to crisis as extreme regimes  (Klein et al  
1997), as well as Bubula and Ökter et al (2003), Rogoff et al (2004). 
Aizemman and Hausmann (2001) included other variables such as the responsiveness of prices to changes in 
the official exchange rate and the financing of activity in domestic and foreign currency debt in order to 
analyze the particularly significant determinants of choice of a foreign exchange regime for emerging 
countries. Modalities based on intervention indices. 
In Algeria, the exchange rate regime is a floating regime (anchoring on several currencies) directed since the 
beginning of the 90s. The Moroccan dirham fluctuates in a fixed parity,  40% of the dollar and 60% of the 
euro, in a 2.5% band. The monetary authorities hope full liberalization that is to say that the price of the dirham 
is set by supply and demand in the market and not in an administered way. Mauritania is under the de facto 
exchange rate regime and is considered to be a mobile exchange rate regime. Since 2014, Ouguiya gradually 
depreciated  against the dollar in a margin of less than 2%. The exchange rate regime in Libya is a managed 
float, meaning that the Libyan central bank intervenes to keep margins of fluctuation. Since May 2016, Tunisia 
has been under a floating exchange rate means that the value of the dinar is determined by the market. 
The purpose of this paper is to establish the determinants of the black market exchange rate for the five 
Maghreb countries selected during the period 1970-1998. The motivation behind the selection of these 
countries can be explained as follows: These countries have a well-developed black market and are 
characterized by different exchange rate regimes. We will then analyze and compare the determinants in order 
to be able to characterize the behavior of the exchange rate on the black market for each country. 
The following questions are of particular interest to us: 
What is the most significant determinant that contributes most to the dynamics of the exchange rate on the 
black market? 
Is official and black market exchange rates linked in the long run? 
Is there homogeneity from one country to another or difference  in the speed of adjustment? 
We present the theoretical framework and the method of analysis based on econometric panel modeling. The 
results of the modeling are exposed and we finish in a last point to approach the conclusion.  
Literature review 
Findings on the determinants of the exchange rate in the market differ across studies and countries (Siddiki 
1999). Some argue that trade restrictions surely lead to the emergence of the black market exchange. Evidence 
shows that there is a negative correlation between foreign exchange reserves and the black market rate. In the 
past, the government had imposed more restrictive trade policies when foreign exchange reserves were down 
(Joshi et al 1984). Ghatak et Siddiki (2001) also reveals that official rates and foreign exchange reserves are 
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determinants of the real exchange rate on the black market in India. Thus, import capacity should be included 
as a determinant of the black market exchange rate. 
Whereas a second current thinks that the excess of the money supply on a given territory leads to the 
development of the black market exchange. Several studies have examined the monetary approach of the black 
market exchange rate in India (Biswas et al 1986) and Gupta (1980). Moreover, Baghestani et al (1993) 
generally explores the relationship between the financial rates and the black market rate and find that the rates 
are co-integrated is that there is a short and long-term relationship between them. The impact of the existence 
of the black exchange market was still controversial. The difference between the official and the black market 
exchange rates makes it difficult to divert export earnings from the official market to the  black market (Kutan 
(1998). The work of Barro and Lee (1993) shows that black markets, with large premiums measured by the 
difference between black and official rates, significantly reduce economic growth. They find that a 10% 
premium reduces the growth of gross domestic product by about half a percentage point. It is in this context 
that many countries have established a legal or tolerated black market because such a black market allows 
traders who are not allowed access to currencies because of restrictions imposed by central banks. Odekun 
(1996) studied the behavior of the black exchange rate of eighteen African countries and found that national 
interest rates led to a depreciation of the national currency on the black market, while global inflation was 
anticipated. The real gross domestic product and the availability of foreign exchange reserves have opposite 
effects. Agénor and Taylor (1993) addressed the causal link between official and parallel exchange rates in 
nineteen developing countries, using a methodological approach based on the statistical theory of co-
integration and Granger causality tests. They showed that co-integration was present in fourteen out of 
nineteen developing countries. 
Moore and Phylaktis (2000) examined the relationship between black and official exchange rates for seven 
countries in two categories by examining short and long-run dynamics. Although it has been noted that the 
short-term dynamic is not modified for the countries of the first group (Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand), the drift is observed for the short-term dynamics of the countries of the second group (Philippines, 
Indonesia and Taiwan). The recovery speed after a shock is slow. Bahmani-Oskooe et al (2002) analyzed the 
long-term link between the official exchange rate and the black market exchange rate over the period 1973-
1990 in 49 countries using unit root tests and co-integration. They conclude that any exchange control has 
only a short-term impact which leads to the deviation of the black market rate and the official rate. Diamndis 
and Drakos (2000) dealt with the official market and the black foreign exchange market in four Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico). They concluded that there is a stable and 
statistically significant long-term relationship between the two exchange rates with the coefficient of unity, 
thus implying a constant black market premium for each country and have shown that the black market 
premium is approaching its long-term equilibrium in a term of 2 to 5 months depending on the country. 
Methodology adopted 
To establish the determinants of the black market exchange rate and the causal links, an econometric model 
was specified. For this, we selected six independent variables, which proved to be robust determinants of the 
black market exchange rate. These variables are cited in at least one of the previous empirical studies. 
The study uses monthly data for the period 1970-1998. We limit ourselves to this period because of the 
difficulty of having reliable black market exchange rates. Throughout our analysis, we used the Eviews 10 
software. 
The model is written as follows: 
tititititititti LPLRLROEXLMOEXDREPLOEXLBOEX   6543210                      (1) 
Table 1. The determinants of the black market exchange rate and the causal links 
Variable Definitions Data sources 
LBOEXit - Logarithm of the black market exchange rate for country i of 
month t. 
- Carmen M.Reinhart 
LOEXit - Logarithm of the official exchange rate country i of the month t. -  World Development Indicators (WDI). 
DREPit  
 
- Differential rate of expected benefits (DREP) of country i of 
month t, proposed by Fishelson (1988) in his empirical test of the 
Dornbusch et al. (1983) on 19 episodes of the black market; 
- WDI, Federal Reserve of the United States. 
 
LMOEXit 
 
- Logarithm of the M2 ratio at the official exchange rate country i of the 
month t. 
- WDI, Central bank 
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Table 1. The determinants of the black market exchange rate and the causal links 
Variable Definitions Data sources 
LROEXit - Logarithm of the real official exchange rate (the official exchange rate 
multiplied by the ratio of US and national price indices) of country i of 
month t; 
- WDI, Federal Reserve of the United States. 
 
 
LRit 
 
- Logarithm of international reserves of country i of month t; - WDI, Central bank 
LPit 
 
Logarithm of the commodity price index of country i of month t; - WDI, United Nations Statistical Basis on 
Commodity Trade 
Ɛt - Error term.  
Source : by author. 
The DREP variable measures the difference from the unhedged interest rate parity and calculated using the formula: 
    tttt idiDREP  111 *                                                                                                                          (2) 
- it* : is the interest rate of the national currency 
- it : is the interest rate of the foreign currency (the dollar) 
1
1

t
t
t OEX
OEXd  :  is the rate of the depreciation of the national currency against the US dollar And and 
OEXt et OEXt-1 is the official exchange rate in t and t-1. 
Empirical results and discussions 
The Granger causality test is used to investigate the existence of a causal relationship between the variables 
involved. However, before this is done, the data used for the study are subjected to a root test, and then we 
estimate the error correction coefficient. 
 Unit root test 
In the empirical analysis, we perform the IPS unit root test (Im et al., 2003). This unit root test for each variable 
(Table 1), in terms of level and difference, shows that with the exception of the variable DREP, the black 
market exchange rate and the six other explanatory variables in the level present solid evidence. a first-rate 
integration. Thus, an error correction model with a co-integration equation could be a more efficient way to 
estimate our model. 
Table 2. Unit Root Test 
Variabe     LO EX  LBO EX    LRO EX   DREP     LR     LP  LMO EX
Method: Im, Level Difference Level Difference Level Difference Level Difference Level Difference Level Difference Level Difference 
 Pesaran et  Shin First First First First First First First
Without trend 5.257  -15.804 2.72  -19.224   -0.359  -16.086  -0.342  -5.66731  -1.402  -18.964 2.75  -18.286  -2.19  -22.248 
 (1.000) (0.000) (0.996) (0.000) (0.359) (0.000) (0.366) (0.000) (0.080) (0.000) (0.997)(0.000) (0.014) (0.000)
with trend 2.021  -16.755  -1.302  -19.227  0.237  -21.130 1.045  -4.353  -0.720  -19.264 0.517  -19.277 1.664  -23.856 
 (0.978) (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.594) (0.000) (0.852) (0.000) (0.235) (0.000) (0.697)(0.000) (0.952) (0.000)  
Source : by author. 
Estimation of the results by Pooled mean group: 
The pooled mean group (PMG) estimator is developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1998) are  part of the 
class of dynamic panel models in which it is accepted that the number of observations is as large as that of 
individuals. He considers that a constant of the model, as well as the short-term coefficients and the variances 
of the errors can differ according to the individuals. The long-term coefficients being constrained to be 
identical for all the units, in particular because of the long-term catch-up or the absence of arbitrage. The 
pooled mean group (PMG) estimator involves the ARDL model and its representation of the error correction 
of long-term relationships. Applying this PMG estimation framework to the specification of our model that 
does not require any prior restrictions, as suggested by Bahmani-Oskooee and Goswami (2005). We use co-
integration techniques for estimation purposes. We will conduct residue-based tests under the null hypothesis 
of no co-integration developed by Pedroni (1999). Table 2 presents the results of co-integration tests. As can 
be seen, the test statistics clearly indicate co-integration, which implies that there is a long-term relationship 
between official and black market exchange rates. 
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Table 2. Co-integration test result 
Panel co-integration Statistics Co-integration, Pooled Mean Group Statistics 
Panel v-Statistic 2,377902    
 (0.0087)    
Panel rho-Statistic -5,622103 Group rho-Statistic -6,814161 
 (0.000)   (0.000) 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5,486477 Group PP-Statistic -5,967272 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Panel ADF-Statistic -4,391548 Group ADF-Statistic -5,246386 
 (0.000)   (0.000) 
Source : by author. 
We recall that we can also use the estimate mean group (MG). As the results of Pearsaran and All (1999) state, 
the average group (MG) estimator assumes that each country has different long-run coefficients that seem to 
be relevant to the estimation of the ARDL model. However, if the heterogeneity of the long-term coefficient 
is not respected, MG will produce an inefficient estimate. Since the results of our co-integration test showed 
that all the variables are co-integrated, we used the pooled mean estimation method. This is used to determine 
the short-term adjustment process in the long-run equilibrium state. The estimate indicates the speed of 
adjustment from the equilibrium state in the short term to the long term equilibrium A higher coefficient on 
the parameters means that the speed of adjustment of the model from the short term to the long term is higher. 
The results of the model (Table 3) show that the coefficient of co-integration (CE) is statistically significant 
at 5%. This implies that there is a long-term dynamic short-term adjustment, the co-integration coefficient is 
0.111868 indicating that 11.19% of short-term errors are corrected in the long term. In general, the term CE 
in the model shows the speed of adjustment of the short-term equilibrium to the long-term state. According to 
this same table, the assumption of a long-term coefficient equal to unity is not rejected. Since the CE 
coefficient is statistically significant, we conclude the existence of a long-term causality ranging from 
independent variables to the dependent variable of our model. With regard to the behavior of the independent 
variables lagged with respect to the dependent variable, We find a confirmation of the negative relationship, 
a priori, the expectation, the fluctuation of the log of the official exchange rate, the foreign exchange reserves, 
the real exchange rate, the price level and the differential rate of expected profits have a negative impact. We 
note that as long as the Hausman test statistics indicate that the restriction of the long-term homogeneity of 
all long-term coefficients can not be rejected in our estimates. 
Table 3. PMG Estimation Results 
                                         Long-term coefficient                                                           
 Coefficients P-value 
LOEX 0.852934 0.0000 
LP 0.01075 0.3757 
LROEX 0.306795 0.0146 
DREP -0.207339 0.331 
LR 0.007988 0.3692 
LMOEX -0.038512 0.0098 
                                    Short-term coefficient                                                
Error correction coefficient -0.111868 0.0013 
 Khi(2) statistic Proba 
Hausman Test 1.291739 0.7311 
Source: by author. 
Error coefficient (EC) of each country: 
As shown in Table 4, the adjustment coefficients meet the expectation of being negative for all countries, with 
the exception of Algeria, for which the coefficient is insignificant. However, the pace of adjustment is 
relatively fast in Tunisia, Morocco and Libya, while it is relatively slow in Algeria and Mauritania. 
Table 4. Country estimates of adjustment coefficients 
Country Error correction coefficient Standard deviation 
Tunisia -0.311211 0.0020 
Morocco -0.219666 0.0010 
Algeria -0.000146 0.00004 
Lybia -0.023631 0.00017 
Mauritania -0.005298 0.00006 
Source: by author. 
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Granger causality test: 
To determine the nature of the causal relationship between the variables included in the model, the variables 
are subjected to a Granger causality test (Table 5). 
Table 5. Wald-Granger causality test 
 F-Fisher Proba Decision 
LOEX does not granger LBOEX 0.74621 0.4743 H0 accepted 
LBOEX does not granger LOEX  13.5113 0.000 H0 rejected 
LMOEX does not granger LBOEX 6.704317 0.0013 H0 rejected 
LBOEX does not granger LMOEX 1.42725 0.2403 H0 accepted 
LROEX does not granger LBOEX 0.78233 0.4575 H0 accepted 
LBOEX does not granger LROEX 2.40731 0.0904 H0 rejected at the treshold of 10% 
LP does not granger LBOEX 0.53023 0.5886 H0 accepted 
LBOEX does not granger LP  0.45528 0.6343 H0 accepted 
LR does not granger LBOEX 1.45078 0.2347 H0 accepted 
LBOEX does not granger LR  1.81757 0.1627 H0 accepted 
DREP does not granger LBOEX 2.19174 0.112 H0 accepted 
LBOEX does not granger DREP  3.5393 0.0292 H0 rejected at the  threshold of 1% 
Source: by author. 
The result of Granger's causality test reveals that there is a unidirectional causality between the independent 
variable: the black market exchange rate (LBOEX) and the independent variables: the official exchange rate 
(LOEX), the exchange rate Real Official (LROEX), and Differential Expected Profit Rate (DREP). The 
granger causality test also shows that there is no causal relationship between the black market exchange rate 
(LBOEX) and the variables: money supply (LMOEX), the level of reserves (LR) and prices. (LP). Indeed, the 
dependent variable does not cause any of the independent variables, while some independent variables cause 
the dependent variable. 
Conclusion 
This study examined the determinants of the black market exchange rate. We have observed that our data is 
co-integrated of order one. Consequently, we establish a long-term dynamic relationship between the 
fluctuation of the exchange rate on the black market and the independent variables namely the and the 
variables: broad money supply (ratio M2 / official exchange rate: LMOEX) , the level of dollar reserves (LR), 
consumer prices (LP), The official exchange rate (LOEX), the official real exchange rate (LROEX) and the 
differential expected profit rate (DREP). The coefficient for adjusting the short term to a long term equilibrium 
is random and heterogeneous from one country to another. Our results also showed that the official exchange 
rate is the most significant variable that most determines the exchange rate on the black market. The official 
real exchange rate plays a secondary role in determining the exchange rate on the black market. These results 
were confirmed by the granger causality test which revealed the existence of a unidirectional causality 
between the dependent variable the black market exchange rate and the independent variables: The official 
exchange rate (LOEX), the official real exchange rate (LROEX) and differential expected profit rate (DREP) 
and that the other independent variables neither cause nor caused by the dependent variable. To master the 
grip of the black exchange market, political decision-makers must adopt stabilization policies by adopting 
measures that allow the diversification of currency sources and a monetary policy of the interest rate based on 
external rates. The establishment of a mechanism to control prices leading to a reduction in dependence on 
the international market. In order to combat the black currency exchange market, several measures are 
recommended. Among the most topical, we cite the currency hedging device and the creation and operation 
of exchange offices for manual exchange. The central banks of the Maghreb countries must establish the 
instructions to the banks relating to the organization and functioning of the interbank exchange market in 
foreign trade operations. Futures contracts and options are presented as instruments enabling the purchaser to 
hedge against an unfavorable change in the exchange rate, by fixing a price, called the forward price as soon 
as the contract is concluded. This work opens up new areas of research that highlight new factors that are 
beyond the control of the monetary authorities. It is therefore a question of rethinking the current exchange 
management models which are still lagging behind the development of electronic currencies. 
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